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I. Introduction 
Across Europe, North and South America, the role of the prosecutor is evolving, 
acquiring greater powers and responsibilities within existing functions, as well 
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as changing more fundamentally as a criminal justice actor, increasingly 
responsible for the disposition as well as the prosecution of cases, and for the 
development and implementation of criminal justice policy. This raises 
important issues about the prosecutor’s status, accountability and independence.  
As the state’s representative in the prosecution of offences under criminal law, 
the prosecutor is required to be independent to ensure the fair and consistent 
application of the law, but also to be accountable in some way to the democratic 
institutions she so publically represents.  Independence and accountability are 
configured differently, depending on where the prosecutor is located within the 
legal and political landscape.  She may function within an executive line of 
appointment and accountability, and so might be expected to promote 
government policy; she may be independent of ministerial hierarchies and so 
able to develop alternative agendas through the structures of the prosecution 
service itself; she may be rooted in the infrastructure of local politics, developing 
criminal responses adapted to local needs; and, she may be elected on a local 
political platform, with populist rather than centralized accountability.   
 Understandings of these contrasting forms of accountability as either 
democratic, or as inappropriately political,1 are located within broader legal and 
political cultures.  In England and Wales, for example, an important dimension of 
the judiciary’s role in upholding the rule of law is their ability to call politicians 
to account in the exercise of their legal powers.  In France, in contrast, as a 
republic, the moral and political authority of the state is paramount, understood 
                                                        
 1 See, for example, Michael Tonry, ''Prosecutors Politics in Comparative 
Perspective,'' in Prosecutors and Politics: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Michael 
Tonry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 1. 
 3 
as representing the will of the (sovereign) people. The unelected judiciary 
remains subordinate to political power within this ‘statist’ tradition, reflected in 
the hierarchical accountability of the French prosecution service to the Minister 
of Justice and in the constitutional status of the judiciary as an authority, rather 
than a power.2 
 The level at which prosecutors are accountable (as well as to whom they 
are accountable) is also likely to determine whether or not we consider it a good 
thing; the implementation of broad prosecution policies disseminated through 
guidance or internal hierarchies is experienced and understood differently from 
interventions or instructions in individual cases. The professional status and 
training of the prosecutor is also important -- whether her role is characterized 
as a partisan advocate or a more neutral judicial figure, has the potential to 
shape the prosecutor’s work and may color our view of her relationship to those 
to whom she must account.  Central to these debates is the relationship between 
independence and accountability, and the nature and extent of prosecutorial 
discretion -- how it is shaped, regulated, and defined within law; how the 
prosecutor understands the limits of the various roles that she plays; and the 
structures of political, professional, judicial and constitutional authority within 
which discretion is exercised. 
                                                        
 2 In 1958, the judiciary was demoted from a pouvoir to an autorité, 
recognizing the fact that the state makes the law, but judges simply apply it.  
They lack the status of a ''power'', as this would rival that of the state and so 
challenge the sovereign will of the people. Although the judicial authority enjoys 
a degree of autonomy, this is regarded by some as serving to legitimate, rather 
than to act as any check upon the actions of the state. See Jean-Claude Magendie 
and Jean-Jacques Gomez, Justices (Paris: Atlas Economica, 1986), 18-20; Sudhir 
Hazareesingh, Political traditions in modern France (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 173. 
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 This paper considers the changing role and power base of the prosecutor, 
with particular focus on her relationship with the police, on whom she depends 
for the investigation and evidence gathering that will form the basis of the 
decision to prosecute. It examines the contrasting ways in which prosecution 
policy is developed and executed in England and Wales and in France, its 
relationship to the public and to the executive, and the importance of the 
professional role and status of the prosecutor in defining her relationship with 
political hierarchies and so democratic accountability.  It also reflects on the 
importance of the individual prosecutor as an independent professional -- the 
extent to which she is a cog in the machine of national policy, is driven by 
bureaucratic and managerialist imperatives, or she enjoys individual discretion 
rooted in her professional expertise and ideology. This analysis is comparative, 
but the nature of the prosecution function, including democratic accountability 
and the exercise of discretion, does not depend simply on the procedural roots of 
a jurisdiction, but on a range of factors, albeit that some of these may be more 
strongly associated with the adversarial or inquisitorial tradition.  
 
II. The Origins of the Police-Prosecutor Relationship 
The prosecution function is made up of relationships with, and dependencies on, 
a range of legal and non-legal actors -- from suspects, witnesses and victims, to 
judges, police officers and defense lawyers.  Perhaps most important among 
these is the relationship with the police, as the front line gatherers and 
producers of evidence.  Public prosecutors in England and Wales and in France 
have seen their role expand in a variety of ways.  This has changed aspects of 
their relationship with the police with whom they work and on whom they 
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depend in different ways to carry out the criminal investigations and evidence 
gathering that will underpin the prosecution case.  France and England and 
Wales do not share the same historical criminal procedural model and the 
police-prosecution relationship is structured differently, reflecting different 
histories and political and procedural values. Aside from the adversarial and 
inquisitorial roots of the two systems which characterize the prosecutor in 
England and Wales as a party to the case, and her French counterpart as a more 
neutral judicial officer whose prosecution role also includes one of investigation, 
the office of prosecutor in the two jurisdictions has evolved at different points in 
time and in response to different circumstances.   
A. France 
In France, the current role of the public prosecutor (the procureur) developed 
during the twentieth century alongside a practice of official police enquiries that 
later became known as the garde à vue.3   Existing outside any formal legal 
regulation, this procedure often resulted in the arbitrary detention of individuals 
and it was only formally legally regulated in 1958.  Defense lawyers had been 
permitted access to the case dossier and to be present during the interrogation 
of the accused by the juge d’instruction (the investigating judge) during the 
instruction investigation from 1897.  This was not well received by many who 
feared this would undermine the effectiveness of the instruction as a search for 
the truth.   
[B]y obliging the juge to warn the accused at his first formal questioning 
that he is free to say nothing, by imposing the presence of a lawyer at all 
                                                        
 3 The role has existed in different guises for centuries. 
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following interrogations, by, above all, constraining the juge to give the case 
file to the defence lawyer the day before every interrogation, this law 
paralyses the action of the judge who can barely hope, even himself, to 
discover the truth.4 
In response, in order to avoid the instruction, the police and the procureur 
developed an alternative procedure for the detention and questioning of 
suspects in order to bypass any involvement of the defense lawyer in the 
investigation.5  This proved to be an effective strategy: the procedure became 
formalized into the garde à vue in 1958, but lawyers remained absent until 1993, 
a century after their arrival in the instruction.6  
 This is in many ways a familiar story of how the strengthening of what we 
would now think of as due process or fair trial rights within one part of the 
                                                        
 4 Herbert Halton, ''Etude sur la procédure criminelle en Angleterre et en 
France'' (Thèse, Faculté de Droit de Paris, 1898), 69 cited by Denis Salas, "Note 
sur l’histoire de l’instruction préparatoire en France," in La mise en état des 
affaires pénales: Rapport de la Commission Justice Pénale et Droits de l’homme, 
Annexe 2, ed. Mireille Delmas-Marty (Paris: La Documentation Française, 1991), 
248. 
 5 Jacqueline S. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice: A Comparative Account of 
the Investigation and Prosecution of Crime in France (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), 117. 
6 Suspects were permitted to see a lawyer for 30 minutes, after 20 hours 
of detention in garde à vue from 1993.  In 2000, access was permitted from the 
start of the garde à vue and finally, after the Grand Chamber judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Salduz v Turkey, Application No. 36391/02  
November 27, 2008, suspects now have access to a lawyer for a 30 minute 
consultation during the police interrogation -- though the lawyer’s role is greatly 
restricted to that of passive observer.  See Jacqueline S. Hodgson, "Making 
custodial legal advice more effective in France: explores the challenges in 
accessing a lawyer when in police custody," Criminal Justice Matters 92, no. 1 
(2013): 14; Jodie Blackstock, et al., Inside Police Custody: An Empirical Account of 
Suspects’ Rights in Four Jurisdictions (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2014); Jacqueline S. 
Hodgson, and Ed Cape, "The Right to Access to a Lawyer at Police Stations: 
Making the European Union Directive Work in Practice," New Journal of 
European Criminal Law 5, no. 4 (2014):450. 
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criminal process, leads to the removal or the undermining of protections in 
another.  In England and Wales, for example, the suspect’s right to custodial legal 
advice following section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was 
then used as justification for the removal or weakening of other defense 
safeguards, such as the attenuation of the right to silence.7  In Scotland, at the 
same time that suspects were granted access to custodial legal advice following 
the decision in Cadder,8 which held Scotland to be in breach of Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) by preventing suspects in police 
custody from accessing legal counsel, the period of police detention was doubled 
from six to 12 hours.9   
 It is also significant as a redistribution of judicial and political power 
within the criminal justice process, as the procureur and the juge d’instruction 
are both judicial officers, but sit within different structures of accountability and 
so, at different points within the constitutional separation of powers.  The juge 
d’instruction is independent of the executive, cannot be moved to a different 
office and cannot be given either oral or written instructions.  Her independence 
is guaranteed by the constitution and she is not subject to the authority of the 
Minister of Justice.  The procureur belongs to a different branch of the judiciary 
(the so-called standing, rather than the sitting judiciary) and is hierarchically 
                                                        
 7 Adverse inferences may be drawn from silence in some circumstances 
under s.34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.  By attaching a 
penalty to the exercise of the right, its value is significantly undermined. 
 8 Cadder v HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43, which followed the European 
Court of Human Rights case of Salduz v Turkey, Application No. 36391/02, Grand 
Chamber judgment, November 27, 2008. 
 9 Section 14 of the Criminal Appeal (Legal Assistance, Detention and 
Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010.  The custody officer may extend detention for a 
second 12-hour period. 
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accountable to the Minister of Justice, a political appointee of the government.  
She is responsible for delivering the government’s criminal justice policy and 
must act within the guidelines set by her superiors and the Ministry circulars.  
Her accountability to a democratically elected Minister is seen as an important 
guarantor of her independence -- she may not pursue her own policies, but must 
act within the law.  Severing the ''umbilical cord'' between the parquet and the 
Minister of Justice has been the subject of decades of discussion and whilst 
lobbied for by the parquet (the collective term for procureurs) and made the 
subject of a parliamentary Bill, recent reform attempts seem unlikely to attract 
the necessary political support.10 
 For North American scholars, this may seem unremarkable, to have 
independence guaranteed directly, or indirectly, through the electorate.  At the 
federal level, the Attorney General and district US Attorneys are political 
appointees of the President’s party and the 2,300 state prosecutors are elected 
mostly at county level and operate a wide variety of policies and practices, 
according to local political conditions.  In France, complete independence from 
the executive is understood to risk unfettered power and the gouvernement des 
juges, where judicial power exceeds that of the elected state.11  To the English 
lawyer, however, accountability to the executive does not guarantee 
independence, but risks political interference.  This concern is not without merit 
as we have seen countless French scandals in which the executive, often under 
                                                        
 10 The proposal also failed in 1998.  To succeed, it requires a three fifths 
majority in the Congress (the union of both parliamentary chambers, the 
Assemblée and the Sénat), which seems unlikely as the current government has 
only a slim majority in the former and is in the minority in the latter. 
 11 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, 77. 
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the direction of the President, has exerted pressure on the judicial system to 
protect its own patrons and supporters.12 
 The trajectory of the development of the garde à vue procedure as a 
means of supplanting the instruction has continued, and investigation under the 
supervision of the procureur now overshadows completely the instruction; less 
than two per cent of cases are dealt with in this way.  The procureur’s growth in 
investigative power in the face of an increasingly due process instruction model 
is also significant as a shift away from an independent judicial investigation, to 
one which is ultimately accountable to the executive, including until recently, the 
power of the Justice Minister to issue written orders to procureurs.  The 
hierarchy of the parquet and the culture of instruction and subordination are 
part of the prosecutor’s career as well as her daily practice.  Promotion is based 
on an evaluation of the procureur that includes her “capacity to implement penal 
policies” and “to be part of the hierarchical relationship”; loyalty and conformity 
are rewarded, whilst independence is penalized.13 The structure of the parquet 
has also ensured that the President and the Minister of Justice have a key role in 
the selection and promotion of procureurs, cultivating a culture of patronage and 
dependence that, even with the removal of written orders, has been hard to 
break.14   
                                                        
 12 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice; Jacqueline S. Hodgson,, "The French 
Prosecutor in Question," Washington & Lee Law Review 67, no. 4 (2010): 1361-
411. 
 13 Mathilde Cohen, “The Carpenter’s Mistake? The Prosecutor as Judge in 
France” (this volume). 
 14 See the observations in Pierre Truche, Rapport de la commission de 
réflexion sur la Justice (Paris: La documentation Française, 1997). 
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 This tension between the two models of investigation and loci of power is 
reflected in government reform agendas that seek to bolster the power of the 
procureur (and so the executive) to the detriment of the more politically 
independent juge d’instruction.  The most recent enquiry to recommend the 
effective abolition of the juge d’instruction in her current role, placing the 
procureur in charge of all criminal investigations, was the Léger Commission, 
reporting in 2009.15  The recommendation (reflecting then President Sarkozy’s 
premature announcement some nine months before the Commission reported in 
September 2009, of his intention to abolish the office of juge d’instruction) was 
undercut, however, by the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Medvedyev v France16 and then Moulin v France,17 in which it was held that the 
procureur was not a judge for the purpose of Article 5 of the ECHR because she is 
a party to the case as a prosecutor and she is not independent of the executive.   
Recent legislation reducing police accountability and increasing the 
procureur’s power to authorize certain investigative measures has also been 
controversial. Following the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, 
emergency measures were put in place, which lacked the usual safeguards of 
judicial guarantees in the exercise of intrusive powers.  Although intended to be 
time limited and exceptional, the government has now sought to place these 
measures on a statutory footing.  The proposed legislation includes greater 
powers for the procureur to authorize wire taps and electronic data capture, 
investigations that may currently be authorized only by the more independent 
                                                        
 15 Philippe Léger, Comité de réflexion sur la justice pénale (Paris: La 
documentation Française, 2009). 
 16 Application No. 3394/03, Grand Chamber Judgment, March 29, 2010. 
 17 Application No. 37104/06, November 23, 2010. 
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sitting judiciary.18  In this way, greater power to authorize measures that 
infringe on the liberties of the individual is being assigned to the public 
prosecutor, whose line of accountability ends with the Minister of Justice.  At the 
same time, the Bill sets out the professional orientation of the procureur in more 
strongly ''judicial'' terms, with a new addition to Article 39 of the code de 
procédure pénale, requiring that the procureur:  
checks the legality of the means implemented by [police officers], the 
proportionality of investigative acts with regards to the nature and gravity 
of the offence, the opportunity to carry out the investigation in this or that 
direction, as well as the quality of its content. He ensures that 
investigations are aimed towards the determination of the truth and that 
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence are collected, in the respect of 
the rights of the victim and of those of the suspect. (Article 22 of the Bill) 
Parliament seeks to increase the power of the prosecutor, whilst also 
strengthening her apparent neutral and independent judicial ideology.  But the 
expression of her professional role in terms similar to that of the juge 
d’instruction is somehow unconvincing.  The simple addition of a new clause to 
the code de procédure pénale changing the description of the prosecutor’s role, 
will not in itself transform the ideology or practices of the profession.19  The fact 
remains that authority is seeping away from the politically independent juge 
d’instruction to the procureur.  Moreover, the legal rhetoric of independence is 
                                                        
 18 Projet de loi no. 3473. This power is proposed in cases of organized 
crime and terrorism. 
 19 The reform is inspired by the recommendation of Jacques Beaume, 
Rapport sur la procédure pénale (Paris:Ministère de la Justice, 2014), 30. 
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not supported by any change in the structure of prosecutorial accountability, 
which remains with the executive.20 
B. England and Wales 
In contrast to the procureur’s long history within French criminal procedure, the 
Crown Prosecutor in England and Wales is a relatively new function, established 
under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.  Prior to the establishment of the 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), there was no public prosecutor in England and 
Wales.  The police were responsible for criminal prosecutions, which they 
brought either in person, or through locally instructed prosecuting solicitors. 
This meant that there was no unified, centralized, national prosecution policy.  In 
their review of criminal procedure arrangements, the Philips Commission 
(reporting in 1981) noted that police prosecution practices varied across the 
country, resulting in inconsistent levels of charging and the prosecution of weak 
cases unsupported by sufficient evidence.21  The police were too close to cases 
and unable to make the legal and forensic judgments required.   
 The Commission recommended the establishment of a national public 
prosecution service headed by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in order 
to address these issues and to professionalize the prosecution of crime. A key 
feature of the new CPS was their independence from the police investigation 
                                                        
 20 Controversially, article 18 of the Bill goes further still and provides the 
police with the authority to detain and question individuals for up to four hours 
without any judicial oversight. Detention is permitted of those for whom ''there 
are serious reasons to think they represent a threat for the security of the state 
or that they are in direct and not coincidental relation with such people'' --- 
without informing the procureur.  When acting in this administrative, rather than 
judicial capacity, the police are under the hierarchy of the Minister of Interior. 
 21 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981), Cmnd 8092, chaired 
by Sir Cyril Philips. 
 13 
phase.  Under the former arrangement, prosecuting solicitors worked for, and 
were consulted by, the police in around three quarters of police forces,22 but had 
only an advisory role.  They were bound to follow the instructions of their client, 
the police, and the prosecution process was under the control of the chief officer 
of police.  With the establishment of the CPS, the initial charging decision 
remains that of the police, but cases then pass to a Crown Prosecutor to assess 
the strength of the evidence and to determine the final charge to be prosecuted.  
This means that the decision not to charge remains with the police; but cases 
where prosecution is anticipated are subject to review by the CPS who 
determines whether to prosecute the case as charged, prosecute a lesser offence, 
or discontinue the prosecution.  In many areas, former prosecuting solicitors 
were appointed as Crown Prosecutors.  However, this loss of power from the 
police to the newly independent CPS was not well received by officers who 
continued to investigate and gather evidence, but could no longer control the 
prosecution process.23  
 Removing from the police the decision to prosecute and making it entirely 
a CPS judgment, addresses the problem identified by the Phillips Commission, 
but the Philips principle, as it is generally known, goes further than this; it sees 
as crucial the separation between the investigation and prosecution phases in 
order to ensure the independence of the Crown Prosecutor’s decision.  This 
might be criticized as a narrow construction of prosecutorial independence on at 
                                                        
 22 Statement of the then Home Secretary, William Whitelaw HC Deb, 
November 20, 1981, vol. 13, c532. 
 23 The CPS deals with the prosecution of cases investigated by the police.  
Prosecutions are also brought by other agencies such as Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs, the Serious Fraud Office and the Health and Safety Executive. 
 14 
least two counts.  First, it casts the police as gatekeepers to the prosecution 
process: where the police decide not to pursue a case, other than in some 
specified circumstances, the CPS will have no involvement or knowledge of the 
investigation.  They are unable to prevent the police from discontinuing 
investigations where the evidence is strong, or where there may be a strong 
public interest in prosecution.  Second, although hailed as a new ministry of 
justice type role, the independence of the Crown Prosecutor function has been 
limited by their reliance on the police for the information on which their 
prosecution decision will be based.  It might be argued that greater involvement 
in the investigative phase could produce better quality evidence and so a better-
informed prosecution decision; the Crown Prosecutor would be less captive to 
the police view of the case.  
 This is very much the approach of the French model, in which the role of 
the public prosecutor, the procureur, is not separate from, but is inextricably 
linked with that of the police investigation.  This stems in part from the different 
understanding of the prosecution process, which in France includes the 
investigation phase carried out under the judicial supervision and direction of 
either the procureur or the juge d’instruction, but it also allows the prosecutor to 
orient the enquiry from a legal perspective.  In England and Wales, whilst the 
Crown Prosecutor may be consulted by the officers prior to charge, it is 
fundamental to the understanding of their roles as independent of one another 
that she is not an authority over the police and that there is a separation of the 
prosecution function from that of investigation.  The procureur, on the other 
hand, is a direct authority over officers as they investigate the case and in 
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particular, during the detention and questioning of the suspect during garde à 
vue. 
 So, we have two very different models -- one in which the prosecutor has 
no power over the police investigation and charging process, understood as a 
necessary function of prosecutorial independence; the other in which the 
prosecutor is a judicial authority over the police, responsible for the 
investigation and prosecution of crime.  In the latter, prosecutorial independence 
from the police might be understood through the power to require them to act in 
certain ways, in contrast to the Crown Prosecutor’s dependence on police 
generated evidence. In my own fieldwork, French officers expressed admiration 
for what they saw as the far greater autonomy enjoyed by the police in England 
and Wales.  In France, questions of independence and accountability center on 
the relationship with the Ministry of Justice rather than the police: the French 
prosecutor’s independence as a judicial officer implementing government policy 
is understood to be guaranteed by the Minister, a member of the executive.  Yet, 
as we shall see, this constraint on power through ministerial democratic 
accountability, carries with it the risk of political interference and so the 
potential to compromise the independence of the procureur. In England and 
Wales, the CPS was established in order to ensure the independence of the 
prosecution function from that of the police and it is this relationship that has 
attracted the greatest attention. 
 
III. The Changing Shape of the Prosecutor's Role 
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The roles of prosecutors in both jurisdictions have expanded in recent years, 
driven principally by a desire to improve efficiency by increasing the number of 
out of court case disposals and by speeding up the process of case disposition in 
general.  In England and Wales, the prosecutor’s function at the local level has 
been strengthened, providing her with greater powers of case disposition, but 
also a new role in mandatory charging advice and decision-making.   At the 
national level, the DPP has developed a policy-making role through the issuing of 
guidance on charge and prosecution in a range of cases (such as domestic abuse 
and assisted suicide) to be implemented uniformly through local Crown 
Prosecution offices.  Although she still lacks authority over officers and any 
powers of direction or instruction, the Crown Prosecutor now works more 
closely with the police and this has been the explicit aim of successive reviews of 
the CPS and the criminal justice process.   
 In France too, the procureur now enjoys greater powers to authorize and 
oversee criminal investigations, as well as an increased range of case disposition 
options, including a guilty plea procedure where a reduced sentence is offered.  
This is one of a range of new procedures in which the defense is now explicitly 
written into the process and the judge’s role has diminished in favor of a more 
party-centered approach.  However, while the DPP in England and Wales has 
begun to develop national prosecution policy in a range of offence areas, this 
remains strictly Ministry of Justice territory in France.  The French prosecutor’s 
policy role, in contrast, has developed through engagement with local political 
and criminal justice actors.  Relationships with the police are also changing in 
different ways. As noted above, the procureur’s role has developed hand in hand 
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with that of the police and the practice of dealing with cases in real time in order 
to speed up decision-making, has led to yet closer working relationships.  In 
contrast to England and Wales, however, where the prosecution is being 
encouraged to work more closely with the police, this has become a cause for 
concern and a recent review of the parquet recommended that prosecutors place 
some distance between themselves and officers, in order to preserve their 
independence.24 As power shifts away from the juge d’instruction and towards 
the procureur, this also represents a shift in the political accountability and 
dependence of criminal justice, away from the judiciary and towards the 
executive.  The counterbalance within the French criminal process is 
increasingly provided (in theory at least) by the defense, rather than by the 
judiciary.  These are very different roles, however -- constitutionally, 
professionally and in their criminal justice function.25 
 In addition to relationships with other criminal justice actors, these 
changes in role and function have also impacted on the organization of 
prosecution work -- the degree of professional autonomy and discretion that she 
enjoys; the extent to which work is becoming standardized and delegated; and 
the extent to which her decision-making is regulated within pre-defined 
structures set by politicians, or the internal hierarchy of senior prosecutors.  
Lines of accountability intersect with changes in the professional role of the 
                                                        
 24 The English Crown Prosecutor is not an authority over the police, so 
closer relationships are not seen to threaten independence in the same way. 
 25 See, for example, Jacqueline S. Hodgson, "Constructing the Pre-Trial 
Role of the Defense in French Criminal Procedure: An Adversarial Outsider in an 
Inquisitorial Process?" International Journal of Evidence and Proof 6, no. 1 
(2002a): 1-16; Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, ch. 4. 
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prosecutor, and the boundaries between local and national politics as well as the 
policy role of the prosecution hierarchy itself, have shifted. 
A. England and Wales: the CPS 
The role of the CPS has evolved since its creation 30 years ago, from the powers 
of individual prosecutors, to the nature of the DPP’s role in guiding and steering 
the organization.  In contrast to France, where national prosecution policy is part 
of the political agenda set by the Minister of Justice, disseminated down through 
the prosecution hierarchy, in England and Wales, the DPP has developed this 
role.  In addition to guidance on charging, prosecution, evidentiary matters, 
protocols on serious investigations, guidance based on case law and what must 
be proved in court, cautions and diversion away from trial, the DPP has 
established policies on the prosecution of particular offences such as domestic 
violence and assisted suicide.  These are important supplements to legislation 
and case law, as the policies on prosecution will determine how the law develops 
subsequently.  Many of these guidelines are preceded by a public consultation, 
the responses to which are published.26  They range from the prosecution of 
child sexual abuse, to prosecution for perverting the course of justice and 
charging in rape and domestic violence cases.  The stimulus for these guidelines 
is often a high profile case that has not gone well, or to provide certainty where 
there is a legislative gap, such as in the case of encouraging or assisting suicide.27  
                                                        
 26 The guidance on the prosecution of assisted suicide followed a web 
consultation which elicited 4,700 responses. 
 27 All of the CPS guidance is published in its website.  See, for example,  
The Director of Public Prosecutions, Policy for prosecutors in respect of cases of 
encouraging or assisting suicide (London, 
2014),http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/assisted_suicide_policy
.html. 
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This is an interesting alternative to more traditional democratic routes such as 
legislative guidance or policy disseminated by a government minister, as 
happens in France.  The DPP is appointed by and responsible to, the Attorney 
General, whose office advises the government and represents the public interest 
in a range of capacities.  This creates a less direct line of political accountability 
and one which, by convention, is “exercised very sparingly, and not used to 
further the narrow political interests of the government and its supporters”.28 
 At the other end of the organization, individual Crown Prosecutors have 
on the face of it, been given more power as they now make charging decisions in 
many instances that were formerly determined by the police.29  Although the CPS 
is divided into 13 areas across England and Wales, each led by a Chief Crown 
Prosecutor, charging advice and decisions are taken by CPS Direct for the most 
part, with Area Crown Prosecutors being involved in some early investigative 
advice and charging.  The police are able to contact CPS Direct through a single 
national telephone number and officers speak to the next available prosecutor.  
Although discussions take place over the telephone, evidence is transmitted 
electronically, as are decisions, providing an accessible case record from the 
outset.  In theory, this places prosecutors closer to police officers in case 
building, and in advising on charge and evidence, but a recent Joint Inspectorate 
Report suggests that there is still some way to go in making this an effective 
                                                        
 28 Antoinette Perrodet, ''The public prosecutor,'' in European Criminal 
Procedures, ed. Mireille Delmas-Marty and John Spencer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 422. 
 29 See CPS, The Director’s Guidance on Charging 2013, 5th edition (London, 
2013), 
,http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/directors_guidance/dpp_guidance_5.html. 
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working relationship.30  It found one third of the cases in which the police 
brought charges, should have been dealt with by the CPS; one tenth of the cases 
dismissed by the CPS should have been decided by the police; and the police 
decision to charge was incorrect in eight per cent of cases.31 
 Whilst officers are free to consult the CPS in any case, this is mandatory 
for more serious and complex cases. 32   This change was made on the 
recommendation of the enquiry headed up by Lord Justice Auld with the aim of 
creating closer working relationships between police and prosecutors so that 
weak cases could be weeded out earlier, and ensuring that more recorded crimes 
resulted in a conviction or some other form of case disposal.  The police tendency 
had been to overcharge, with high numbers of judge ordered and judge directed 
acquittals.  This may be because the police adopt a more subjective and less 
formal and legalistic approach, or because they anticipate that more evidence 
will emerge justifying the higher charge -- or it may also flow from the 
differences in charging standards: the police are not required to take account of 
public interest considerations, but this is written in to CPS guidance.  After 
piloting the procedure in 2002, legislation amended the Police and Criminal 
                                                        
 30 HMIC, The Joint Inspection of the Provision of Charging Decisions 
(London, 2015), https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmic/wp-
content/uploads/joint-inspection-of-the-provision-of-charging-decisions.pdf., 
which was carried out jointly by Her Majesty’s CPS Inspectorate and Her 
Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary. 
 31 ibid, para 1.12. 
 32 CPS, Director’s Guidance, para. 7 states that early investigative advice 
(EIA) may be provided in serious, sensitive or complex cases and it should 
always be utilized in cases involving death, rape or other serious sexual offences.  
HMIC, Joint Inspection, para. 6.4 found that EIA is well established in the CPS 
Headquarter units (such as counter terrorism), but not in local areas. Officers 
were uncertain as to what was available and the Joint Inspectorate found that 
only two out of 13 rape cases and one out of 21 cases involving other serious 
sexual offences in their sample had sought EIA (paras. 6.5-6.7). 
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Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) to transfer charging decisions from the police to the 
DPP, through local Crown Prosecutors.  Under section 37A(1) PACE, the DPP 
now has the power to issue guidance to police custody officers on how to 
facilitate the Crown Prosecutor’s charge decision.  Crown Prosecutors now direct 
(rather than advise) officers on formal cautions, warnings and reprimands also. 
The CPS guidance, in contrast, requires decisions to be based on a review of the 
evidence, not on an oral report.  The Attorney General and the DPP regard this 
shift in roles as the most significant change in the relatively brief history of the 
CPS, expanding the CPS role and limiting constabulary independence as set out in 
ex parte Blackburn.33 
 One perhaps unexpected consequence of this different way or organizing 
charge and prosecution is that the process is more closely regulated both for 
prosecutors and the police.  Crown Prosecutors have a range of legal guidance 
that they must follow such as when to apply the Full Code Test, or the Threshold 
Test; 34  when to characterize offences within certain categories such as 
homophobic violence or domestic abuse, and so follow the charging guidance on 
                                                        
 33 R v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn [1968] 
2 QBD 118. Lord Denning stated that whilst every police officer is under a duty to 
enforce the law of the land, they are wholly independent of the executive and not 
subject to the orders of the Secretary of State: “The responsibility for law 
enforcement lies on him.  He is answerable to the law and to the law alone” (769 
per Lord Denning, M.R.). 
 34 The Threshold Test may be applied where the suspect “presents a 
substantial bail risk if released and not all the evidence is available at the time 
when he or she must be released from custody unless charged.  The Threshold 
Test may be used to charge a suspect who may be justifiably detained in custody 
to allow evidence to be gathered to meet the Full Code Test realistic prospect of 
conviction evidential standard.”  CPS, Director’s Guidance, para. 11.  
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these and other offences.35  The result is that prosecutors are less reliant on their 
own professional discretion as lawyers following an evidential and public 
interest test.  Instead, they are required to justify their decisions and their 
application of specific criteria through detailed record keeping that is subject to 
later review.  This forms part of the file that will be passed to those working at 
the next stage of the prosecution process.  Other than in serious, complex and 
sensitive cases where early investigative advice (EIA) should be sought, no single 
Crown Prosecutor is responsible for a case;36 the file will pass through numerous 
sets of hands, with the result that case ownership is difficult to establish. This 
more bureaucratic model shares many of the features of an inquisitorial model.37 
 The other aspect that is significant in this way of organizing work, driven 
also by the constant need to work within a smaller budget, is the increased use of 
non-professionally qualified staff.  Section 7A of the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985 empowers the DPP to designate Crown Prosecutor powers and rights of 
audience to non-legal staff, and to determine their training.  A significant 
proportion of prosecution work, including bail decisions and guilty pleas, is now 
carried out at court by associate prosecutors (APs).  These are typically, 
experienced former administrators within the CPS who have undergone one 
                                                        
 35 CPS, Domestic Abuse Guidelines for Prosecutors issued by the DPP 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/domestic_abuse_guidelines_for_prosecutor
s/; CPS, Guidance on Prosecuting Cases of Homophobic and Transphobic Crime 
issued by the DPP, 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/homophobic_and_transphobic_hate_crime/   
For the full range of legal guidance issued to the CPS, see  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/.   
 36 There should be ''continuity of prosecutor'' where the CPS has provided 
EIA.  CPS, Director’s Guidance on Charging, para. 7.  
 37 Jacqueline S. Hodgson, “Hierarchy, Bureaucracy and Ideology in French 
Criminal Justice: Some Empirical Observations,” Journal of Law & Society 29, no. 2 
(2002b): 227. 
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week’s training on criminal law and one week on criminal procedure.38  The 
widespread use of these APs is indicative of the level of routinization that now 
characterizes criminal justice in the courts in England and Wales.  It also creates 
a tier of CPS staff that is further removed from the usual lines of accountability. 
 In addition to stronger powers in charging decisions, Crown Prosecutors 
are now empowered to issue conditional cautions with punitive (rather than 
rehabilitative or reparative) conditions attached.  Although a relatively minor 
measure, used infrequently,39 this nonetheless represents a transfer of power 
from the judiciary to the CPS.  The Attorney General has described this as the 
offender’s choice, with the benefit of legal advice, but this is a weak notion of 
consent in a criminal process that makes guilty pleas the norm, enforced through 
a series of systematic and institutional pressures.  Neither can basic 
constitutional principles be traded off for efficiency.  This is a punishment 
(rather than a prosecution diversionary measure) and its administration by a 
prosecutor (lacking even the basic judicial status of the French procureur) does 
                                                        
 38 For further detail and the selection and training of APs see CPS, The CPS 
Annual Report and Accounts 2014-15, Annex E (London, 2015), 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/annual_report_2014_15.pdf.  
 39 Out of court disposals issued by the CPS at the pre-charge stage (a 
simple caution, conditional caution, reprimand, final warning or offence to be 
taken into consideration) accounted for 0.6% of the 500,000 cases prosecuted in 
2014/15 (CPS, Annual Report and Accounts 2014/15).  The numbers have 
declined, but were never more than 2.4% in 2008/09, (CPS, CPS Annual Report 
and Resource Accounts 2010/11, Annex B, (London, 2015), 
https://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/2010/annex_b.html).  Recorded 
crime has declined steadily over the last decade from around 6 million in 2004 to 
around 4 million in 2014, a decrease of one third (see Figure 1), see Office for 
National Statistics, Crime in England and Wales: Year ending December 
2015(London, 2015), 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/bulle
tins/crimeinenglandandwales/yearendingdecember2015.  Prosecutions have 
halved in the same period from over one million to 500,000. 
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not offer Article 6 ECHR fair trial guarantees.40  This increased power in the 
criminal process, and in the disposition of cases in particular, places 
accountability for the prosecutor’s exercise of her discretion further under the 
spotlight. 
B. France: the Parquet 
In England and Wales, the story has been the gradual transfer of power from the 
police to the public prosecutor.  In France, power has shifted from the judge to 
the procureur (who has always exercised the same powers as the police), 
avoiding the lengthy pre-trial instruction and reducing the use of formal 
prosecution and the court disposition of cases in favor of a more speedy process 
handled by the prosecutor.41   These include warnings (rappels à la loi), 
mediation, reparation and rehabilitation schemes but more significantly also the 
imposition of fines or community work (compositions pénales).  There is also a 
range of rapid trial procedures, including the guilty plea procedure, the 
comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité (CRPC).42 The criminal 
response rate measured as a percentage of recorded crime where the offender is 
identified and there is evidence for prosecution, stands at 91%.  40% of these are 
                                                        
 40 This is what Andrew Ashworth calls the borderlands of fair trial. See 
Andrew J. Ashworth, ''Manslaughter: direction to jury - diminished 
responsibility,'' Criminal Law Review October (2006): 88. 
 41 Antoine Garapon, La prudence et l’autorité: l’office du juge au XXIe siècle 
Rapport de l’IHEJ (Paris: Ministère de la Justice, 2013), 107 describes the 
procureur’s role as no longer being that of determining whether to prosecute or 
to drop a case.  She now has a range of options allowing her to satisfy the 
broader demand for a criminal ''response''.  This range of case pathways, from 
sanctions to punishments, to compensation and mediation, are often referred to 
as the ''third way''. 
 42 For further discussion see Jacqueline S. Hodgson, “Guilty Pleas and the 
Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice,” in The Prosecutor in 
Transnational Perspective, ed. Erik Luna and Marianne Wade (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 116-134. 
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dealt with by some form of alternative to prosecution, 5% by composition pénale 
and 46% by going to trial or instruction.43  Even those cases going to trial are 
often channeled through procedures such as comparution immediate that are 
within the control of the procureur. This places the procureur in a key position, 
determining the disposition of nearly half of all cases.   
 It is perhaps assumed that these measures ease the pressure on the 
courts by diverting cases away from trial, but the effects of these changes are not 
uniform across France.  For example, comparing two court regions, Aubert 
demonstrates that whilst official figures suggest consistent results, in Bobigny 
these procedures are used to deal with cases that are not a local priority, but in 
Bordeaux they are used to deal with cases that would not have been prosecuted, 
thus having a net-widening effect.44 Official statistics show that over the last 
decade, the procureur has dealt with greater numbers of cases, but the courts 
continue to try between 12 and 13 per cent of recorded crime, or between 45 
and 46 per cent of prosecutable offences.  The increased workload of the 
procureur has not been to reduce the court’s docket, but to provide a response to 
cases that would otherwise have been dismissed.  Dismissals have halved from 
25 per cent of prosecutable crime to 12 per cent, while cases settled by the 
                                                        
 43 Ministère de la Justice, Une réponse  pénqle pour 91% des auteurs 
d'infractions (Paris, 2015), http://www.justice.gouv.fr/budget-et-statistiques-
10054/infostats-justice-10057/une-reponse-penale-pour-91-des-auteurs-
dinfractions-28451.html.  
 44 Laura Aubert, “Systématisme pénale et alternatives aux poursuites en 
France: una politique pénale en trompe-L’œil”, Droit et Société. 74, no. 1 (2010): 
17-33. 
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prosecution have risen from 28 per cent of prosecutable offences to 44 per 
cent.45 
 The function of the procureur is no longer principally that of accuser, but 
now includes responsibility for the management of caseloads and the disposition 
of a significant proportion of criminal cases.  Justice has moved out of the 
courtroom and into the office of the parquet.  This, of course, renders justice less 
visible as these procedures are not open to the public.  There is no judge present 
(she will approve the procedure later, without even the presence of the 
procureur), only the accused’s lawyer, but her role as potential negotiator and 
party to the case means that she cannot fulfil that same function provided by 
independent judicial oversight.  Traditionally, the magistrat has been seen as the 
first defender of the rights of the accused, but the procureur lacks the 
independence of the juge d’instruction and this is no substitute for active defense 
rights.  The prosecutor’s role is to ensure that the suspect’s rights are respected 
throughout the criminal procedure, not actively to challenge the legality of 
actions or to champion the rights of the accused. 
 The nature of the procureur’s supervision of the police has also changed 
in some respects. As she has gained more power and responsibility, her 
supervision has become more intrusive. However, just as earlier research noted 
the bureaucratic nature of the procureur’s supervision of the police 
investigation,46 contemporary forms of oversight remain overly focused on detail 
                                                        
 45 Ministère de la Justice, Statistiques: Activité des parquets des TGI (Paris, 
2015), http://www.justice.gouv.fr/statistiques.html and Ministère de la Justice, 
Chiffres Clés de la Justice 2015 (Paris: Directeur de la publication, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/chiffres_cles_20151005.pdf. 
46 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, ch 5. 
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and procedure, rather than with strategic oversight.  The ‘real time’ procedure of  
traitement en temps réel (TTR) provides a good example of this.  Designed to 
ensure that decisions re prosecution are made faster, this procedure requires the 
procureur to base her decision on the oral account provided on the telephone by 
the officer; the prosecutor will have seen neither the case file nor the accused.  
This has been criticized by the Beaume review as being too involved and 
intrusive,47 turning the procureur into a form of ‘supercop’ and so threatening 
her independence. The prosecutor’s role is not to oversee the daily conduct of 
affairs, but to ensure the legality and proportionality of police measures and to 
supervise the general direction and quality of the investigation.  However, 
Mouhanna criticizes the standardizing effect of this procedure, as prosecutors 
orient cases towards police standard documentation and high rates of 
prosecution.48 The more closely involved in the investigation she is, the less that 
the procureur can claim impartiality.  
 As in England and Wales, these changes have an impact on the nature of 
the prosecutor’s way of working.  In France, the procureur has increasingly 
become an administrator or manager, responsible for the effective management 
of caseloads and accountable for the nature and level of response to criminal 
cases.49 The corresponding increase in the auditing of their work, however, is 
                                                        
 47 Police officers are angry at the time they have to wait to get through to 
the parquet office on the telephone; prosecutors are frustrated that they are now 
less available for the more serious and long term investigations. Jacques Beaume, 
Rapport sur la procédure pénale, 28. 
 48 Christian Mouhanna and Benoit Bastard, “Procureurs et substituts: 
l’évolution du système de production des décisions pénales” Droit et Société 74, 
no. 1 (2010):35-53. 
 49 As in England and Wales, these methods that require prosecutors to 
manage caseloads as quickly, efficiently and inexpensively as possible are drawn 
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experienced by procureurs less as a means of ensuring an appropriate criminal 
response and more as a way of managing the parquet itself.50 This came to a head 
in January 2016 when 86 per cent of the 168 procureurs in France decided not to 
produce their usual annual report for the Minister of Justice, but a less detailed 
version that would not include tables of figures that had to be produced by hand, 
as they did not have the technology to produce the required statistics. 
 Neither are the procureur’s fellow judicial officers immune from this 
bureaucratic, rather than democratic, accountability.  Justice is measured by 
quantitative standards that focus on the avoidance of delay above all else, and so 
the number of cases processed.51 There is frustration with these managerialist 
imperatives to move cases along quickly and to involve prosecutors in minor 
cases that are easily oriented, leaving a gap where they are needed in more 
serious and complex cases.  The TTR, for example, is also characterized as part of 
a trend to move to a faster procedure that depends on an oral account, resulting 
in a less considered review of the written evidence.  This further undermines the 
professional identity of the judiciary, requiring decisions to be governed by 
economic, rather than judicial imperatives.52  Furthermore, the responsibility 
placed on prosecutors to set clear justice priorities and ensure that cases are 
disposed of rather than discontinued, is in direct tension with the budgetary 
                                                                                                                                                              
from the world of business and the language of productivity, and so are alien to 
those in the judicial world. Garapon, et al., La prudence et l’autorité. 
50 Philip Milburn, et al., Les procureurs: Entre vocation judiciaire et 
fonctions politiques (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2010), 94-5. 
51 Court areas and even individual judicial officers are measured by their 
productivity, by the fruits they bear.  This emphasis on efficiently and reducing 
delay has resulted in the number of cases dealt with increasing by one fifth in the 
last decade.  Garapon, et al., La prudence et l’autorité, 70, footnote.101. 
 52 Garapon, et al., La prudence et l’autorité. 
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constraints they face.  It is a familiar story: prosecutors are required to do more 
with less, wrapped in the euphemistic rhetoric of efficiency. 
 One aspect of managing these growing caseloads more efficiently (that is, 
more cheaply) is to delegate work.  This is a feature of much modern 
professional life, from health, to education, to justice, as a rational response to 
increased demands and accountability, at the same time as budgets are 
shrinking.  In England and Wales, criminal defense lawyers engaged in the mass 
delegation of criminal work to trainee solicitors and clerks in the 1980s and 
1990s, with the result that their businesses thrived, but clients’ interests were 
subordinated to profit.53  As noted above, a good deal of magistrates’ court work, 
the responsibility of Crown Prosecutors, is now assigned to non-legally trained 
Associate Prosecutors.  Delegation is also a feature of the modern French 
prosecution function.  Many aspects of the procureur’s work are now carried out 
by mediators and associate prosecutors (délégués du procureur) who are 
typically former police officers or gendarmes.  They operate a policy of auto 
prosecution with procedures such as the composition pénale and ordonnance 
pénale. Taken together with this increasing culture of accountability, this offers a 
reshaped picture of the profession -- one in which decisions about the procedure 
to follow are more standardized and less within the professional discretion of 
the procureur whose role is becoming less judicial and more administrative.54  
The procureur is at the center of criminal justice decision-making, but much of 
this is carried out in more standardized and pre-determined ways.  If the 
                                                        
 53 Mike McConville, et al., Standing Accused: The Organization and 
Practices of Criminal Defense Lawyers in Britain (Oxford: OUP, 1994). 
 54 See also Garapon, et al., La prudence et l’autorité, 110.  
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mainstay of judicial safeguarding and accountability is increasingly subject to the 
administrative demands of the executive, this has important implications for the 
balance of power within criminal justice. 
          The procureur’s role as local policy maker has also become significant.  In 
addition to the top down hierarchical structures of policy and accountability 
associated with classic inquisitorial-type procedures,55 the procureur now works 
with the police, local government, customs and border police to set priorities and 
to develop effective ways of handling cases.  The TTR, for example, began as a 
local pilot but was then rolled out nationally.  Historically, local security matters 
would have been the concern of local government (the préfet) but the procureur 
is now a visible part of civil society and local political life and her role within 
local policy-making has developed as a demand of a more security-oriented civil 
society.   Although the procureur has welcomed this, confident that she is able to 
differentiate her judicial role clearly from that of the more political préfet, her 
magistrat colleagues are less convinced.  There is a certain paradox in that it is 
her judicial status that defines her role, and the necessity for that role, within 
local politics, yet the further enmeshed within the local political administration 
the procureur becomes, the weaker her status as magistrat in the eyes of her 
judicial colleagues.56   
 This paradox is situated within a wider debate as to whether the 
procureur should retain the status of magistrat along with juges du siège, or 
whether her role as investigator and enforcer of government policy sets her 
apart.  For their part, procureurs fear professional relegation to the rank of 
                                                        
 55 Hodgson, ''Hierarchy, Bureaucracy and Ideology,'' 227-57. 
 56 Milburn, et al., Les procureurs, 137. 
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functionary and positioning within a hierarchy headed by the Minister of 
Interior.  They see a government that determines the parquet’s role against its 
will and an alliance between judges, lawyers and parliament to impose a more 
accusatorial procedure in which the procureur role will narrow to that of simply 
the accusing party and her judicial role will necessarily wither away.  Given the 
tiny minority of criminal matters now dealt with by the juge d’instruction and the 
omnipresence of the procureur in the investigation and prosecution of crime, the 
prospect of her turning into a superpolicier would remove the current guarantees 
of independence and protection of rights and freedoms in favor (in theory, at 
least) of a more European rights based approach.57  This would require a much 
improved and developed criminal bar, which currently is playing catch-up with 
the growth in suspects’ rights and which has yet to be recognized as a serious 
guarantor of justice either by the judiciary or the government.58 
 In addition to, and often in tension with this more local role, the parquet 
also receives directives and circulars from her own hierarchy, coming down from 
the Minister of Justice -- but also from the Minister of Interior.  These are of such 
a quantity that 80% of cases now fall within priority areas for action.59  There 
has also been something of a legislative explosion of criminal legislation and 
                                                        
 57 The Beaume Report warned against the procureur becoming a kind of 
supercop operating more as a superior police officer than a judicial authority. 
See Beaume, Rapport sur la procédure pénale, 28. 
 58 Jacqueline S. Hodgson, “The role of lawyers during police detention and 
questioning: a comparative study,” Contemporary Readings in Law and Social 
Justice 7, no.2 (2015): 47-56; Cape and Hodgson, “The right of access to a 
lawyer''; Hodgson, “Custodial Legal Advice,” 14-15; Jacqueline S. Hodgson, 
“Safeguarding Suspects’ Rights in EU Criminal Justice: A Comparative 
Perspective,” New Criminal Law Review 14, no. 4 (2011): 611-665; Hodgson, 
“Constructing the pre-trial role, ”1-16. 
 59 Milburn, et al., Les procureurs, 92. 
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prosecutors report difficulty in keeping abreast of the range of procedures now 
in place for different offence types.  As a result, procureurs are overloaded with, 
sometimes contradictory, demands and report feeling torn between their 
response as professionals, their role in shaping local criminal justice and security 
policy, and the demands of an executive (which increasingly includes the 
Minister of the Interior, as well as the Minister of Justice) keen to secure electoral 
success.  An example of the tension created by these executive orders is the 
circular issued by the Minister of Interior inviting the parquet to contribute to an 
interministerial initiative to increase the number of identity checks carried out 
on the outskirts of schools.  This was not coordinated with local policies, nor did 
it take account of local conditions.  Only later was a circular from the Justice 
Minister issued, corroborating these instructions.60  The prosecutor’s role in 
safeguarding individual freedoms and as a local criminal justice policy actor, 
have become important modes of retaining her professional role and autonomy, 
and of resisting pressure on the parquet from the state, to be instrumental in 
putting into effect its repressive criminal justice agenda.61  
 
IV. The Relationship Between Independence and Democratic Accountability  
Discussion of concepts such as independence, accountability and democracy are 
riddled with difficulties.  On the face of it, they appear to be positive, just as 
unaccountability, dictatorship and a lack of independence appear to be negative.  
But these are not universal concepts that mean the same thing wherever they 
                                                        
 60 Milburn, et al., Les procureurs, 93. 
 61 Milburn, et al., Les procureurs, 101-2. 
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appear; they are at times interlinked and are highly context-dependent.  As 
discussed above, prosecutorial independence and accountability are shaped in 
part by different historical and professional factors, but also by the balance of 
roles and responsibilities between legal actors,62 by the nature of prosecutorial 
discretion, the procedural tradition (itself connected to the political culture, as 
noted by Damaška),63 and even relations with the media.64  In comparing the 
different constructions of prosecutorial independence, Di Federico characterizes 
the process as one of accommodating two conflicting values at the operational 
level: 
On the one hand, there is awareness that public prosecution contributes 
substantially to the definition and implementation of criminal policy.  This 
requires that mechanisms be devised to ensure that the active role played 
in that crucial area be somehow directed and controlled in the context of 
the democratic process.  On the other hand, the need to guarantee that 
public prosecution be exercised with rigour, consistency and fairness 
makes it necessary to ensure that too close a tie with the political process 
be not unduly used by the existing majority to influence the conduct 
                                                        
 62 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice,  ch. 3, especially pp79-85 on the 
contrasting roles of juge d’instruction and procureurs and their assertions of 
independence in response to political pressure. 
 63 Mirjan Damaška,  "Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal 
Procedure," Yale Law Journal 84 (1975): 480-544. 
 64 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, 82-3; Éric Zemmour, ''Justice et 
médias, les nouveaux aristocrates de la Ve,'' Pouvoirs 99 (2001): 163-70. 
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(actively or by omission) of public prosecution for partisan purposes; 
more generally to ensure that citizens be treated equally.65 
In the US, the role of prosecutors in the “definition and implementation of 
criminal policy” is “directed and controlled in the context of the democratic 
process” through the election of prosecutors in the locality where they serve. 
This populist model is criticized by some, such as Michael Tonry, as being 
“lawless” because prosecutors “exercise their enormous power over citizens’ 
lives without being accountable to anyone but the electorate”.66  In Italy, in 
contrast, “absolute priority is given to the value of independence”67 with no 
relevance accorded to democratic accountability to either an electorate or 
political power.68 This is explained in part by the historical and political context 
of the prosecution function.  Political independence and autonomy were 
considered paramount in establishing the prosecution function after World War 
II in order to avoid the political discrimination experienced during the Fascist 
period.  This was accompanied by a principle of mandatory prosecution to avoid 
any arbitrary or political exercise of power.  The result has been, argues Di 
Federico, the unjustified aggrandizement of the status of the profession and the 
exercise of discretion in a fragmented way that reflects personal and local 
                                                        
 65 Giuseppe Di Federico, ''Prosecutorial Independence and the Democratic 
Requirement of Accountability in Italy,'' British Journal of Criminology 38 (1998): 
373. 
 66 Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics. 
 67 Di Federico, ''Prosecutorial Independence and the Democratic 
Requirement,'' 375. 
 68 See also Carlo Guarnieri, ''Prosecution in Two Civil Law Countries: 
France and Italy,'' in Comparing Legal Cultures, ed. David Nelken (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth Pub Co, 1997), 183-93; Carlo Guarnieri, and Patrícia Pederzoli, The 
Power of Judges.  A Comparative Study of Courts and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
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preferences, rather than equal treatment before the law or any form of 
democratic accountability.69 
 In England and Wales and in France, this balance is struck in different 
ways. In France, prosecutors are not elected, but they sit in a direct hierarchical 
structure of authority with the Justice Minister at the apex.  This might be 
described as a kind of second tier democratic input, through the filter of an 
already elected government.  This has the advantage of uniformity and 
coherence, and perhaps the expertise and professionalism of government, but 
risks the imposition of the will of presidents and prime ministers on matters of 
justice, potentially compromising the independence of decision-making.  The 
procureur is also increasingly implicated within local civil society, working 
alongside local politicians to shape local criminal justice policy. In England and 
Wales, prosecutors are neither elected, nor do they sit within a political/judicial 
hierarchy.  There is a more indirect political accountability through the 
politically appointed DPP and the Attorney General, with a high degree of 
professional autonomy, albeit increasingly regulated through prosecution 
guidance and charging standards issued by the DPP.  The professional status and 
the legal and political histories of prosecutors in England and Wales and France 
                                                        
 69 He quotes (1998: 380) Giovanni Falcone, the judge who prosecuted, 
and ultimately was assassinated by, the mafia in 1992: “How can it be 
conceivable that in a liberal democratic regime we do not yet have a judicial 
policy, and everything is left to the absolutely irresponsible decisions of the 
various prosecutors’ offices and often even to the personal decisions of their 
members? In the absence of institutional controls on the activities of public 
prosecutors, [there is] the peril that informal influences and hidden connections 
with hidden loci of power might influence their activities. It seems to me that the 
time has come to rationalise and co-ordinate the activities of public prosecutors 
rendered de facto unaccountable by a fetishistic conception of the principle of 
mandatory criminal prosecution.” Giovanni Falcone, Interventi e Proposte (1982-
92) (Milan: Sansei, 1994), 173-4. 
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are different, as are their models of democratic accountability and the 
relationship to prosecution policy.   
A. The Parquet: Democratic Accountability Through Hierarchy 
The solution in France has been to maintain a clear link with the executive, 
ensuring that the prosecutor acts within the sphere determined by a 
democratically elected politician.  This is achieved through a mixture of Ministry 
directives and policy guidance from within the hierarchy of the parquet itself.  
For prosecutors, this provides a broad context, allowing individuals to provide 
responses that are adapted to the locality and the individual, without 
undermining the fundamental principle of democratic accountability.  As one 
senior procureur explained it: 
Of course there are problems of standardization...you cannot follow the 
same politique pénale everywhere because the cases are different, the 
populations are different, the problems are different...In one instance you 
will prosecute far more offenders than in another, because there is less 
delinquency…A uniform system of justice, which is delivered in the same 
way everywhere and so which does not take account of differences, would 
effectively be a non-democratic system of justice. [A6]70 
However, some have also criticized the broad discretion that this allows. 
Justice varies in different regions.  You will not be prosecuted for some 
offences in some places -- which basically means that you can commit 
more crime in the city.  I saw a case in the Alps when a person was 
                                                        
 70 Procureur adjoint, interviewed in field site A, quoted in Hodgson, French 
Criminal Justice, 230. 
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prosecuted for letting out his cattle.  They said it was a breach of public 
order there -- but I think hitting your wife is worse than that, yet it is not 
prosecuted [here].  I think they prosecute minor offences to justify their 
existence.  [Procureur, Site D]71 
This runs the risk of going beyond applying central policy in a way adapted to 
local or individual needs, and undermining the democratic line of accountability. 
In this way, transgression of the same law leads to sanctions in one place, 
to total impunity in another.  Diverted from its objective, as soon as what 
should and should not be sanctioned is translated into something over 
which there is total choice, the discretion to prosecute runs the not 
insignificant risk of resulting in unacceptable distortions in crime control 
between different jurisdictions; and that would go way beyond what could 
be justified by the criminal policy legitimately followed by each parquet 
according to its particular local conditions.72 
In my own research, it was clear that these differences extended beyond court 
areas, to the exercise of individual discretion in a way considered by some to 
undermine democratic and hierarchical accountability.  Some magistrats denied 
any personal choice in the application of the law. 
The one thing I am afraid of is to have a moment of emotion.  Sometimes, 
when I have a person before me, I try to make them face up to their 
responsibilities and when I see him leave [my office for court] I know that 
he is going to get four or six months in prison and sometimes that breaks 
                                                        
 71 Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, 231. 
 72 Magendie and Gomez, Justices, 102. 
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my heart.  But I have a responsibility, a politique to respect and I apply it. 
[A2]73 
Others recognized the inevitability of individual discretion, unconstrained by 
broader policy. 
The fact that the evidence must all be in writing does not prevent us from 
having a significant amount of leeway.  It is procedural, but it does not 
prevent us from reacting...I am not at all tolerant of sexual offences, but I 
had a colleague who just didn’t give a damn.  It depends on your 
personality. [A4]74 
This was also corroborated by police officers we surveyed. 
The policies or decisions of certain magistrats are, in identical 
circumstances but in different places, often different.  The differences in 
treatment are sometimes surprising, at the heart of the same jurisdiction.  
The personal involvement of some magistrats is difficult to manage.  This 
subjectivity, without basis, is experienced quite negatively by police 
personnel. [Police questionnaire respondent 5]75 
In this way, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the regional and individual 
level can conflict with the application of criminal justice policy set by the 
Ministry of Justice, and so undermine democratic accountability.  On the other 
hand, it might be argued that local differentiation better serves local needs, 
                                                        
 73 Junior procureur, interviewed in site A, quoted in Hodgson, French 
Criminal justice, 232-3. 
 74 Junior procureur interviewed in site A, quoted in Hodgson, French 
Criminal Justice, 234. 
 75 Quoted in Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, 234. 
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especially given the procureur’s role developing policy and new initiatives 
alongside local political and criminal justice actors.  This might be seen as a form 
of local democracy shaping the prosecution function. 
 However, there is also broad discretion at the individual level.  This 
includes the unfettered discretion enjoyed by the procureur in middle ranking 
offences (délits) concerning whether or not to open an instruction investigation, 
or to deal with the investigation herself.  There is no legal guidance and so 
prosecutors may exercise their discretion to keep the investigation under their 
power, a decision that will necessarily deprive the accused of the due process 
rights that she would be afforded during the instruction.  The courts have been 
inconsistent on this issue and what should or should not motivate the decision to 
retain a case within the jurisdiction of the procureur -- a trial court first striking 
out such a procedure in 2012, but the Cour de Cassation in 2013 upholding it as 
not in any way infringing the accused’s right to a fair trial on the grounds that 
these rights would be available once at trial, so the accused was not 
disadvantaged.  However, there is a world of difference between enjoying access 
to the dossier, being able to request investigative acts and having the benefit of 
legal assistance and representation all as pre-trial rights, rather than simply at 
trial.  
 A different kind of threat to prosecution and democracy in France is also 
represented by the executive itself.  Historically, executive control of the parquet 
extended to instructions in individual cases, transforming executive or 
democratic structures of accountability into unacceptable opportunities for 
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political interference.76  Rather than ensuring the consistent and impartial 
application of the law, instructions in individual cases enabled the government of 
the day to protect favored individuals from scrutiny, undermining the 
independence of the procureur and of the law.  Orders were given to delay or to 
dismiss cases that may have ''unfortunate and unforeseen consequences for a 
number of political representatives'' as this was considered necessary to protect 
the interests of the state.77 Many of these incidents involved senior politicians 
seeking to keep cases away from the independent juge d’instruction (over whom 
they exercise no control) and under the authority of the more politically 
malleable procureur.  Even where cases have been investigated by the juge 
d’instruction, the procureur’s lack of political independence has been of concern.  
In 2009, at the close of investigations into former French President, Jacques 
Chirac, for the misuse of public funds and breach of trust, the procureur 
recommended that no prosecution be brought on the grounds that there was 
insufficient supporting evidence.  The juge d’instruction, Xavière Simeoni, 
disagreed and in a 215 page report, she set out why she considered that at least 
21 of Chirac’s associates were not in fact genuine employees.78 In December 
2011, Chirac was convicted and given a two year suspended prison sentence.79 
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 Furthermore, whilst directives and policy guidance are in written form, 
affording a degree of transparency, instructions in individual cases were oral and 
secret.  Even following reforms that required instructions to individual 
procureurs to be in writing, prosecutors reported continuing to receive oral 
instructions from their superiors, acting as a conduit for the Minister.  Given the 
controlling influence on the procureur’s career exercised by the hierarchy 
headed by the Justice Minister, the historic culture of obedience and 
subordination was difficult to break in practice.80 Legislation in 2013 now 
forbids the Minister of Justice from issuing any instructions to prosecutors in 
individual cases. 
B. The CPS: Accountability and Policy From Within 
CPS accountability is very different from that of the French procureur.  Crown 
Prosecutors are not under the direct authority of the Justice Minister, even 
through local internal hierarchies as in France, and as discussed above, the 
executive’s relationship with the prosecution and the judiciary is also different. 
The executive hierarchy within which the parquet sits is regarded as a legitimate 
form of democratic accountability in France. As a republic, the state represents 
the will of the people. In England and Wales, this would be considered political 
interference with the criminal process. Whilst in France the State is and 
represents the public interest, ''Common law countries […] regard the public 
interest as an interest separate from that of the state -- moreover, an interest 
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which is often in direct conflict with the interest represented by the 
government.''81 Representing or acting in the public interest is an important 
aspect of democratic accountability and this has been incorporated into the 
development of prosecution policy, principally through an open and transparent 
process of public consultation.  After concerns were raised about the democratic 
legitimacy of the DPP setting out prosecution policy on assisted suicide, the 
practice of public consultation around CPS policies was instituted, with the 
results being published on the CPS website.82  This would not be regarded as 
legitimate in France, where the public interest is understood as something 
different from and greater than the sum of private interests.83 For the CPS in 
England and Wales, however: “The frequency with which the public’s views are 
sought provides some assurance that the current public interest factors carry 
with them their acceptance and support”.84 
Although the CPS works with local police in order to provide information 
on high volume and priority crimes, it does not actively shape local policy. 
Guidance on a range of issues, procedures and offences is set nationally by the 
DPP, and CPS case record keeping reflects this explicitly, especially in key areas 
such as domestic violence and rape, where different procedures must be 
followed, evidence thresholds may differ and police-CPS consultation is required. 
                                                        
81 Vera Langer, “Public Interest in Civil Law, Socialist Law, and Common 
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However, the accountability of prosecutors themselves is not centralized. The 
organization of the CPS into charge teams, magistrates’ court teams, Crown Court 
teams, rape and serious sexual offences teams and so on, reflects the 
segmentation of the criminal justice process, but also means that it is rare for 
one single prosecutor to have ownership of the case file. A series of decisions and 
reviews take place at each stage and so accountability itself is fragmented, 
limited to a specific range of actions at different points in the process. At the 
other end of the scale, the work of the CPS as a whole is subject to oversight. 
Cases are reviewed and decision-making is audited by national inspectorates, 
and performance targets are set nationally and locally.   
We have seen that French prosecutors are subject to a form of macro 
democratic accountability from the Minster of Justice, but individual decisions 
are subject to little scrutiny. This stems from the legal cultural understanding of 
the application of law as an objective process, which leads to a logical and 
inevitable conclusion. Reasons are not, therefore, considered necessary, 
shielding the decision of the individual prosecutor from review.  In the criminal 
process in England and Wales, the existence of discretion is recognized explicitly 
and so is more closely regulated.  In contrast to the mass of DPP policy guidance 
for Crown Prosecutors, and requirements to demonstrate compliance by case 
record-keeping, the procureur enjoys almost unfettered discretion to determine 
how to proceed with a case.  With more regulation comes the possibility of 
review, as there are clear criteria against which to measure the proper exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. This transparency of decision-making lends 
legitimacy to the work of the CPS and provides the possibility for public 
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challenge, but can be experienced by prosecutors as a constraint on the exercise 
of their professional judgment. 
V. Conclusion 
In both jurisdictions, the prosecutor’s role in determining the prosecution, 
treatment and disposition of criminal cases is now significant. There has been a 
shift away from judicial processes (and so from the corresponding safeguards of 
transparency and publicity), towards pre-trial prosecution determinations that 
are designed to be faster and cheaper, and so more efficient. Mechanisms of 
accountability need to reflect these changes in the prosecution function in order 
to maintain the legitimacy of the criminal process. However, given differences in 
legal and political culture, as well as the role and functions of the public 
prosecutor in France and in England and Wales, we might not expect the same 
mechanisms of democratic accountability to be in place. Indeed, the concept 
itself is interpreted differently through the broader question of what is 
understood to be democratic -- whether this engages the state or the public -- 
and the nature of prosecutorial accountability -- whether this operates at the 
level of national or local policy, or of the individual case decision. In both 
jurisdictions, democratic accountability for prosecution policy more broadly is 
regarded in positive terms.  It encourages uniformity and consistency and so 
fairness in the application of the law.85 Operating at the level of individual cases, 
                                                        
 85 Fairness is also a problematic concept and this account of fairness may 
be contested: absolute uniformity may appear unfair in some circumstances, as 
expressed by some of the procureurs quoted above.  The concept of adaptation – 
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important in French criminal justice.  This form of discretion tempers the harsh 
rigidity of uniformity, but sits comfortably within the professional ideology of 
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however, it is the reverse.  It seeks to impose differential treatment on an 
individual, undermining the consistency and independence of the law, replacing 
it with political favoritism and advantage. 
 There are also clear differences in the nature of local and national models 
of democratic accountability.  In France, there is a tension, and even a 
contradiction, between the demands of local and national democracy as it relates 
to the prosecution function.  Locally, the procureur is closely associated with the 
préfet, a government appointed head of local police and security.  She works with 
the local political administration and other agencies in order to develop local 
criminal justice policy and responses to crime.  However, at the same time, she is 
subject to targets and a variety of output measures set by the Justice Minister.  
Garapon et al (2013) talk about a different kind of democratization of justice, in 
which the government is implicated in everything from advancing the rights of 
victims; ensuring that more cases are disposed of; an explosion of criminal 
legislation; setting targets re cost-saving, reducing delays, case management and 
overall measures of efficiency.  The result is that prosecutors and other judicial 
officers are governed more by economic imperatives than judicial reasoning. The 
need to comply with these national policies and target outputs, together with 
nationally determined budget constraints, creates a conflict of interests for the 
procureur and undercuts her ability to set workable local policies and targets. 
 The different procedural traditions of England and Wales and of France 
also affect the relationship between prosecutorial independence and democratic 
accountability.  The inquisitorial framework of the French criminal process vests 
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greater power in the procureur than is enjoyed by the Crown Prosecutor, and 
together with her judicial status, this relegates the defense to a relatively 
marginal role, suggesting that the concentration of authority that independence 
implies, should be tempered by a democratic steer.  Even with recent reforms 
that allow the defense a greater opportunity to participate in the investigation 
and trial of cases, the defense remains in a weak position from which to call the 
prosecutor to account.  The judicial status of the procureur is understood to 
justify the concentration of power and of trust in the office of prosecutor: as a 
magistrat she represents the public interest and ensures compliance with due 
process safeguards.  Who better to entrust with the impartial application of the 
law? Yet, she is not a judicial officer for the purpose of Article 5 ECHR and in 
practice, her judicial status has been found to clothe in neutrality a police and 
crime control orientation. 
 Whilst the democratic accountability of the procureur is understood to be 
provided through the hierarchical organization of the parquet, with the Justice 
Minister at its head, in England and Wales, the democratic accountability of the 
CPS lies more in the public’s participation in the development of prosecution 
policies (developed by the DPP rather than a politician) and in the possibility of 
review. The autonomy of the Crown Prosecutor is limited, however, by the 
plethora of policy guidelines that must be followed and by the rigid division of 
case processing into pathways and stages. Discretion is defined and regulated 
and so subject to later scrutiny. The picture is very different in France. By 
denying the existence of a broad discretion, even in the face of the accepted 
practice of ensuring that the criminal response is ''adapted'' both to the offender 
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and the locality, the French procureur enjoys a high level of professional 
autonomy in her decision-making. Despite the generally bureaucratic nature of 
inquisitorially rooted procedures,86 paradoxically, it is in England and Wales and 
not in France, that the individual accountability of the public prosecutor is 
greater. 
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